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Systemic Risk in the Banking Industry of the United States 
Weiyu Gao 
In this thesis, I estimate the systemic risk in the U.S. banking industry and the effects of a 
financial regulation and an event on the financial health and stability of U. S. banks. The financial 
regulation and event are respectively Basel I and the U.S. sub-prime mortgage financial crisis 
which are captured by two dummy variables. I estimate systemic risk using the definition which 
considers a systemic crisis as an event causing a simultaneous default of a significant number of 
financial institutions. Thus, the systemic risk here is the simultaneous probability of default of a 
certain number of financial institutions. Next, I form two systemic risk indices, including the 
default probability based on bank assets and the default probability based on the number of banks. 
I investigate the sources of systemic risk and address the factors which are significantly related to 
the stability of the banking system. In order to conduct this investigation, I establish two 
categories of variables related to systemic factors and bank specific factors. The systemic factors 
include the median correlation of assets, volatility of assets and capitalization while the bank 
specific factors consist of time trend, bank size and the ratio of book value of equity to total assets. 
The regression analyses are applied between the systemic risk indices and the systemic/ bank 
specific factors. The results suggest that Basel I does not effectively improve the stability of the 
banking system and that the financial crisis contributes to systemic risk. The volatility of assets 
and capitalization are significantly related to the systemic risk indices. Although the systemic 
factors perform better than the bank specific factors in explaining the systemic risk indices, bank 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In the light of multiple financial crises in the past three decades, issues on financial stability have 
gained renewed prominence in the literature in recent years. The worldwide financial crisis which 
began in 2007 has simulated a new examination of the source and transmission of risk in the 
financial sector and its mechanism for affecting the financial system. Since the default of Lehman 
Brothers in the autumn of 2008, the term “systemic risk” has become very topical and literally 
attracted the attention of many financial researchers.  
There is still a widespread confusion with regards to the definition of systemic risk and the 
precise definition, in the words of Schwarcz (2008), remains somewhat unsettled. Bandt and 
Hartmann (2000) first identify a systemic event as a release of negative information associated 
with the failure of a financial institution or collapse of a financial market which may conduct a 
chain of adverse effects upon other institutions or markets. Next, they define systemic risk as a 
significant probability of a default of the entire financial system. Schwarcz (2008) summarized 
previous works and concludes that a common factor in these various definitions of systemic risk 
is a trigger event that can be an economic shock or institutional failure which induces a chain of 
negative economic consequences, also referred to as a domino effect. 
The development of financial engineering and communication technologies has significantly 
transformed the entire financial environment. One of the most important consequences of this 
change is the acceleration of financial sector integration. Due to the increase in the correlation of 
the financial market, each financial institution cannot be treated on an individual basis. Any 
single failure has the potential to simulate a domino effect and cause a subsequent contagion, 
which is defined by Gleeson, Hurd, Melnik, and Hackett (2011) as the spread of failures through 
a financial system, within which any successive default will increase pressure on the remaining 
components of the system. Furfine (2012) classifies systemic risk into two types. The first is the 
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risk that a financial shock induces a simultaneous default of a set of financial institutions. The 
second is the risk that the failure of one or several financial institutions spreads through the 
financial system and increases the burden on other institutions.   
The objective of this thesis is to estimate the systemic risk of the U.S. banking industry over the 
sample period and investigate whether financial regulations and events, including Basel I and the 
U.S. sub-prime mortgage financial crisis, had a significant impact on the stability of the U.S. 
banking system. The sources of systemic risk are also investigated in this thesis. Previous 
research was mainly focused on measuring the risk of individual banks. In this thesis, I will use 
the methodology developed by Lehar (2005) to measure systemic risk at the level of a banking 
system. In addition, I also attempt to examine which factors are the main drivers of systemic risk 
in the U.S. banking industry. 
My thesis contributes to the study of systemic risk in the following ways. First, I focus on the 
systemic risk of the banking industry which has never been explored by using the approach 
developed by Lehar (2005) in previous research. In the banking industry, the term “systemic risk” 
is vitally concerned and is usually connected with the analysis of crises in the banking sector by 
both academic researchers and regulators. According to Berger, Kashyap and Scalise (1995), the 
U.S. banking industry has experienced a dramatic change over the last half century. They point 
out that due to the diversification of financial resources, the industry has been gradually losing 
market power over its large borrowers who can choose among many other alternatives financial 
sources. Also, as the financial industry has developed, the position of the banking sector has 
evolved from a protected monopoly, in which banks can purchase deposit funds at below-market 
interest rates, to a regular market sector in which they must compete with other kinds of financial 
institutions to raise funds. These changes indicate that the banking industry has become an 
integral component of the U.S. economy. Summer (2003) points out that according to historical 
experiences of financial crises, the huge spillover costs to the real economy often come from 
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systemic banking crises. Thus, the stability of the economy is highly related to the safety of the 
U.S. banking industry. 
Second, the sample period covers the implement of Basel I after 1988 and the U.S. sub-prime 
mortgage financial crisis in 2007 which are captured by two dummy variables. The historical 
experience related to financial crises simulates regulators to design financial regulations to 
constraint each institution’s risk and improve financial safety. For instance, Basel I regulates a 
new risk-based capital standard which required banks to maintain 8% capital backing for loans 
and 0-1.6% capital backing for government securities. This new capital standard caused a shift of 
the U.S. bank investments from commercial lending to government securities. Wagster (1999) 
and Furfine (2000) report that this banks’ assets re-allocation obliged by the new capital standard 
of Basel I restricted credit and this new standard is one important reason causing the credit crunch 
in 1989 which had negative effect on the health of the U.S. banking system.  
The more recent financial event, the sub-prime mortgage financial crisis happened in 2007, is 
another important issue of concern in the U.S. banking industry. Schwarcz (2008) explains why 
the default in the sub-prime mortgage-backed securities markets has quickly infected the other 
asset-backed markets and even the entire banking system. First, different asset-backed securities 
are tightly connected. The default in the sub-prime mortgage damaged the confidence of investors 
who further avoided all other securitization products provided by banks. The second reason can 
be explained by adverse selection. Investors became uncertain about securitization products and 
the counterparties. They cannot judge whether the product or counterparty is good or not; thus, 
they stopped investing in all securitization products. The negative reactions of the investors had 
unpleasant effects on the U.S. banking industry. With the measure of systemic risk, I explore 
whether these two events have significantly affected the stabilization of the U.S. banking system.  
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Third, I investigate which factors have significantly explained systemic risk. By following Lehar 
(2005), I establish three systemic factors including the median correlation of assets, asset 
volatility and bank capitalization, and three bank specific factors consisting of time trend, bank 
size and the ratio of book value of equity to total assets. The systemic factors demonstrate the 
stability of the entire banking system and the bank specific factors reflect the financial health for 
each individual bank. Thus, these factors can explain the dynamic of systemic risk in the banking 
industry. For regulators, these explanatory variables can provide valuable information to detect 
the sources of systemic risk and establish regulations to maintain the stability of the system. In 
order to conduct the research, I use the definition of Lehar (2005) who considers a systemic crisis 
as an event which causes a simultaneous default of a significant number of financial institutions. 
Although it is not possible to identify a point at which an individual default turns out to be a 
systemic event, it is possible to establish two systemic risk indices. The first index, the systemic 
risk index based on assets (SIV), is the default probability of a certain fraction of the total assets 
for the entire sample of banks. This index is driven by large banks, and increase in the value of 
their assets or asset volatility will significantly affect this measure of risk. The second index, the 
systemic risk index based on the number of banks (SIN), is the probability that more than a 
certain fraction of banks will fail simultaneously.  
Before measuring systemic risk, it is necessary to estimate the banks’ market value of assets. This 
is done by applying a contingent claims analysis. According to Gray, Merton and Bodie (2008), a 
contingent claim is any financial asset whose future payoff depends on the value of another asset, 
which means that the contingent claim can be considered as an option. Since 1973, option pricing 
methodology has been used to value a wide variety of contingent claims. Based on Merton (1974), 
a bank’s equity can be interpreted as a call option on its assets.  Since the value of and volatility 
of a company’s equity are measurable since equity is traded in the stock market, while the value 
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of and the volatility of a company’s assets are not measurable since the assets are not traded, this 
framework allows an estimation of the value of the banks’ assets and the volatility of their assets.   
Next, I build regression models to estimate the effects of Basel I and the financial crisis and 
investigate the relation between the systemic/bank specific variables and the systemic risk indices. 
To implement the regression analyses, I construct the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The implementation of Basel I has a negative effect on the health of the U.S. 
banking industry. 
Hypothesis 2: The U.S. sub-prime mortgage financial crisis has a negative effect on the stability 
of the U. S. banking industry. 
Hypothesis 3: The systemic factors perform better than the bank specific factors in explaining the 
measures of systemic risk. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature on systemic risk measurement. In Section 3 the database and sample selection are 
described. The model and methodology are introduced in Section 4. The results are reported in 
Section 5. Finally, conclusions are provided in Section 6. 
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
Research on systemic risk measurements can be generally separated into two streams. The first 
stream of research focuses on the definition of systemic risk. The second stream of research 




2.1. Definition of systemic risk 
Research which focuses on the definition of systemic risk may be further sub-divided into three 
groups, namely, bank contagion, banking panics and spillover effects. 
2.1.1. Bank contagion 
Bank contagion is defined by Gleeson, Hurd, Melnik, and Hackett (2011) as the spread of failures 
through a financial system, within which any successive default will increase pressure on the 
remaining components of the system. Bank contagion is mainly based on the correlation between 
bank defaults, bank returns, and fund withdrawals, as well as exposures among operating banks 
where a default of one or a small number banks would increase pressure on the remaining banks.  
Jorion (2005) argues that the implementation of unitized portfolio management tools such as 
option pricing, portfolio insurance, and Value at Risk (VAR) would cause similar trading patterns 
or “herding” behavior, for instance, that investors within a group tend to buy or sell when other 
similar participants buy or sell. The generalized use of risk management systems has the potential 
to increase volatility in times of stress and reduce the safety of financial markets, which could 
raise systemic risk. On this basis, Jorion analyzes the risk of trading revenues of U.S. commercial 
banks which all apply the VAR–system for risk management and tests the relationship between 
the VAR-induced herding effect and the stability of financial markets after 1998. The results 
exhibit no increase in volatility of trading revenues during the testing period.  
Bartram, Brown, and Hund (BSS) (2007) develop three approaches to measure systemic risk. The 
first method that they apply relies on testing the effect of financial shocks on the stock price of 
the sample banks that are not directly exposed to the shocks. Based on market efficiency, the 
negative information from financial shocks should only affect the banks which are exposed to the 
financial shocks. Then the abnormal performance of unexposed banks can be considered as the 
effect of influence from the exposed bank but not the direct effect of shocks. Thus, the abnormal 
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stock price reaction can be interpreted as a measure of systemic risk. Using Merton’s (1974) 
model, BSS also create maximum likelihood estimates of bank failure probabilities as a function 
of sample banks’ characteristics which include the market value of assets, face value of debt and 
deposits, and asset volatility. Next, they interpret the difference between the probabilities prior to 
and following the financial shocks of the banks which are not directly exposed to the shocks as 
the measure of systemic risk. The third estimator of systemic risks that they use is implied by 
equity option prices for assessing systemic risk.  
2.1.2. Banking panics, aggregate fluctuations, and lending booms 
The second group of empirical studies related to systemic risk includes banking panics, aggregate 
fluctuations, and lending booms. Gorton (1988) states that bank panics may be caused by relative 
consumer behavior preceding the panics. The results support this hypothesis that bank panics can 
be explained by consumer behavior during non-panic times.  
In more recent research, Bhansali, Gingrich and Longstaff (2008) extracted the credit risk 
component of systemic risk from credit index derivatives. They developed a linearized version of 
the collateralized debt obligation pricing model with the prices of credit index derivatives to 
extract market expectations about the nature and magnitude of credit risk in financial markets. 
Their results suggest that systemic risk during the 2007-2009 financial crisis is twice as large as 
the risk associated with the GM credit-downgrade event in May 2005. De Nicolo and Lucchetta 
(2009) study systemic risk from the viewpoint of macroeconomics. They investigate the impact 
and transmission of structurally identifiable shocks between the macro economy, financial 
markets, and intermediaries.  
2.1.3. Spillover effects and joint crashes 
The historical systemic risk literature included in the third group involves spillover effects and 
joint crashes in financial markets. This research is mainly based on ARCH models, extreme 
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dependence of securities market returns, and securities market co-movements, which are not 
explained by fundamentals. These studies focus on currency and financial crises experienced in 
the second half of the 1980s and 1990s. For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) apply a 
simple vector auto-regression model to analyze Granger-causality between the interest rates and 
exchange rates of five specific Asian currencies in the pre- and post-crisis periods. The results 
suggest that many Granger-causal relations are detected following the Asian crisis, but none 
existed prior to the crisis.  
 
2.2. Quantification of systemic risk 
Research which focuses on the quantification of systemic risk may be further sub-divided 
into two groups, namely, the structural approach and the reduced form approach, as 
classified by Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2011). 
2.2.1. Structural approach  
The papers in this group adopt a structural approach by using contingent claims analysis of the 
financial institution’s assets. With the use of contingent claims analysis, Gray, Merton and Bodie 
(2008) test the sensitivity of the enterprise’s assets and liabilities, originating from the risk-
adjusted balance sheet, to external financial shocks. They indicate that at the national level, the 
sectors of an economy can be viewed as interconnected portfolios of assets, liabilities, and 
guarantees. Gray and Jobst (2009) develop a systemic contingent claim analysis (CCA) 
framework based on Black (1973) and Merton (1977) for measuring and managing financial risk 




2.2.2. Reduced – form approach 
The second group involves the papers which take a reduced-form approach, focusing on the 
statistical tail behavior of the financial institutions’ asset returns. Hartmann, Straetmans and De 
Vries (2005) develop a new method based on multivariate extreme value theory to measure 
individual banks’ exposures to each other and to systemic risk. Based on extreme stock price 
movements, they establish the systemic risk indicator of the banking system by constructing 
conditional probabilities, conditioning single or multiple bank stock price “crashes” on other 
banks’ stock price crashes or on crashes of the market portfolio. Then the extreme co-movements 
measured by multivariate conditional probabilities between individual banks’ stock returns are 
considered to be able to capture the risk of contagion from one bank to another, while the extreme 
co-movements between individual banks’ stock returns and the market index are meant to assess 
the instability of the banking system during periods of financial shocks. The authors also compare 
the stability of the banking system in the world’s two largest economies, the United States (US) 
and the European Union. The final results conclude that the systemic risk in the US is higher than 
the risk in the European Union.  
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) introduce a new systemic risk indicator called “CoVaR” which 
is developed from the concept of Value at Risk (VAR), the prefix “Co” standing for conditional, 
contagion, or co-movement. Institution i’s CoVaR relative to the system is defined as the VaR of 
the whole financial sector conditional on institution i being in distress. Next, the difference 
between the CoVaR conditional on the distress of an institution and the CoVaR conditional on the 
normal state of the institution provides the marginal contribution of this institution to the overall 
systemic risk. They also estimate the extent to which certain characteristics such as size, leverage 
and maturity mismatch contribute to systemic risk.  
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Huan, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) build an indicator of systemic risk through forward-looking price 
information from two highly-liquid markets, the credit default swaps market and the stock market.  
The information used includes credit default swap (CDS) spreads and equity prices of individual 
banks, from which two vital parameters of systemic risk, the probability of default of individual 
banks and the asset return correlations, are derived.  
The work of Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2011) fills the gap between the two 
approaches, the structural model and the reduced-form approach. By applying an economic model 
involving welfare, externalities, and taxation, they demonstrate the way of using observable 
market data in stress tests.  
 
Chapter 3. Data and Sample 
In this thesis, I focus on the systemic risk of the U.S. banking industry. The target sample consists 
of 100 U.S. commercial banks ranked by size, namely, the logarithm of the book value of assets. 
The details of all the banks included in the target sample are shown in Table 3.1 the banks are 
regulated by the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the 
Comptroller of the Currency.  All of these commercial banks come from the list of the large 
commercial banks located in the Federal Reserve Statistical Release. Through the bank IDs 
recorded in the list, the banks’ data can be located in the Database. Some banks are excluded 
from the sample list due to missing information; thus, the rank of the banks in the sample is from 
No. 1 to No. 158. 
The commercial banks in the database come from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (FRB 
Chicago). Their data are contained in the Report of Condition and Income, also named “Call 
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Report”.  These reports provide balance sheet, income statements, risk-based capital measures 
and off-balance sheet data. 
Data on the quarterly book value of assets, debt and equity for each bank are obtained from the 
Bank Regulatory Database for the period 1976 – 2010. Thus, the time range used in this research 
is from March 1976 to December 2010. The database also provides accounting data for 
commercial banks, bank holding companies, savings banks, and savings and loans institutions in 
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Chapter 4. Methodology 
The measure of systemic risk applied is developed by Lehar (2005) and this method is able to 
estimate the systemic risk at the level of a banking system. This approach is based on the 
definition which considers a systemic crisis as an event which causes a simultaneous default of a 
significant number of financial institutions. It is difficult to identify a threshold at which an 
individual default turns out to be a systemic event; however, I am able to establish two systemic 
risk indices. The first index, the systemic risk index based on assets (SIV), is the default 
probability of a certain fraction of the total assets for the entire sample. This index is driven by 
large banks whose increase in their value of assets or asset risk will significantly affect this 
measure of risk. The second index, the systemic risk index based on the number of banks (SIN), 
is the probability that more than a certain fraction of banks will fail simultaneously.  
In order to create these two systemic indices, it is necessary to estimate the banks’ market value 
of assets. This estimation is done by applying a contingent claims analysis, in which a structural 
model is used to estimate the market value of the bank’s financial assets. Giammarino et al., 
(1989) point out that there is usually no observable market value for a bank’s assets, and it is 
difficult to obtain the market value for use in the regulatory process, because these assets usually 
consist of loans that are not actively traded in the financial markets. By following the approach of 
Black and Scholes (1973) who indicate that almost any asset can be viewed in an option pricing 
framework, Giammarino et al., (1989) treat a bank’s equity as a call option on the bank’s assets.  
A call option allows the holder to purchase a specified stock at the exercise price during a certain 
period. At maturity, the value of the call option is  
                                                      𝐶 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 0, 𝑆 − 𝑋                                                      (1) 
where C is the value of the call option, S is the market price of the stock, and X refers to the 
exercise price of the option.  
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According to the approach developed by Black and Scholes (1973), the bank’s equity, which can 
be interpreted as a derived asset whose value depends upon the value of the bank’s assets and 
which often has an observable market value, has a value given by: 
                                                      𝐸 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 0, 𝑉 − 𝐵                                                     (2) 
where V refers to the total value of a bank’s assets and B refers to the face value of total debt 
liabilities. Both of the equations (1) and (2) present the mechanism linkage between the pay-off 
structure of equity and the pay-off structure of a call option. 
 
4.1. Market Value of Assets 
4.1.1. The Merton Framework 
The framework developed by Merton (1973) is used to establish the relationship between the 
market value of equity and the market value of the firm. Assuming that the market value of a 
bank’s assets V follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift µ and volatility σ: 
                                                         𝑑𝑉 = µVdt + σVdz                                                   (3) 
Next, equity 𝐸𝑡  can be viewed as a call option on the assets of the bank and based on the Black-
Scholes-Merton model: 
                                              𝐸𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡𝑁 𝑑𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡𝑁(𝑑𝑡 − σ 𝑇)                                       (4) 









                                                          (5) 
where 
𝑉𝑡: The market value of the bank’s assets at time t; 
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𝐵𝑡 : The current notional value of the bank’s debt; 
N: The cumulative standard normal distribution function; 
T: The time to the next audit of the bank or the maturity of the bank’s debt; 
σ: The volatility of the bank’s assets. 
In equation (4), T refers to the maturity of the bank’s debt; however, it is not possible in practice 
that all the liabilities of the bank have the same maturity. Merton (1977) points out that the length 
of time until maturity can be reinterpreted as the length of time until the next audit of the bank’s 
assets. Then, in the next audit period, if the value of the bank’s assets is less than the value of the 
liabilities, the auditors will declare bankruptcy of the bank. 
Ronn and Verma (1986), using Ito’s lemma, derive a linear relationship between the volatility of 
equity 𝜎𝐸 and the volatility of asset 𝜎.  This is given by: 






 𝜎                                                    (6) 
The value of 𝜎𝐸 can be estimated using the GARCH model. The equations (4) and (6) are two 
equations with two unknowns, which can be solved by the Newton-Raphson method to obtain the 
total market value of the assets of the bank, V, and the standard deviation of V, 𝜎. 
Under the linear volatility relationship used in Ronn and Verma (1986) to obtain the equity 
volatility, 𝜎𝐸 is inappropriately considered to be a constant. In order to overcome this problem, 
Duan (1994) and Duan (2000) develop a new method to obtain maximum likelihood estimates 





4.1.2. Maximum Likelihood 
The main purpose of the maximum likelihood estimation is the transformation from observed 
data to unobserved data. In this method, the most important part is the derivation of a likelihood 
function based on the observed data. Duan (1994) and Duan (2000) apply standard theory on 
differentiable transformations to conclude that the maximum likelihood function is given by: 






lnσ2 −  lnVt 
m
t=2  σ −  ln⁡(N(dt 
m
t=2 )) 




Vt  σ 
Vt−1   
− μ mt=2                                                            (7) 
where Vt (σ) is the solution to equation (4) corresponding to a sequence E = (𝐸𝑡), t ∈  1, … m , of 
equity value and a sequence B = (𝐵𝑡), t ∈  1, … m , of the notional value of the bank’s debt. The  
dt  corresponds to the dt  in equation (5). Based on Lehar (2005), the equity 𝐸𝑡  is treated as a call 
option on the assets 𝑉𝑡  with a strike price equal to the face value of the bank’s debt at the maturity 
T that is assumed to equal to one year.  
The sample period is from March 1976 to December 2010. The first 40 quarters, from March 
1976 to December 1985, are used as an estimation period to calculate the results for the 41
st
 
quarter. Then the estimation window is rolled forward by one quarter to obtain the results for the 
next quarter. Thus, the relevant estimates are obtained for each quarter of the test period from 
March 1986 to December 2010. 
There are two unknowns, 𝑉𝑡  and its volatility σ in equation (4).  A numerical method is applied to 
obtain the Vt (σ). First, a series of 100 values for σ are assumed ranging from 0.01 to 1 at intervals 
of 0.01. Next, coupled with a sequence of equity values 𝐸𝑡  and face value of debt 𝐵𝑡 , each σ is 
introduced in equation (4) to obtain a series of values of Vt (σ) which correspond to 𝐸𝑡  and 𝐵𝑡 . 
Thus, a matrix of Vt (σ) with 100 rows and 140 columns is constructed. In the next step, each row 
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of Vt (σ)  with the corresponding σ  is substituted into equation (7). Through maximizing the 
likelihood function, an optimum set of Vt (σ) with corresponding σ is obtained. The estimation 
window is 40 quarters and corresponds to the previous 10 years. The previous 40 quarters are 
used to estimate the next quarter’s values; thus, the value of m in equation (7) is 41. The 
estimation window is then rolled forward by one quarter. This procedure provides parameter sets 
of µ and σ and the optimum market value of asset Vt  for each quarter in the estimation window 
for all banks over the entire sample period from the first quarter of 1986 to the last quarter of 
2010. Table 4.1 below shows summary information of the market value of assets for the sample 
banks. 
1 0 
Table 4.1 Summary statistics on the market value of assets of all banks included in the sample 
 
Type 






All banks 1,817,285 29,542,889 5,438,038 4,344 
Top 10 banks 1,099,510 22,822,577 5,438,038 438,928 
Last 10 banks 20,663 135,172 18,488 10,193 
 
 
4.1.3. Robustness consideration 
For the robustness consideration, the set of σ can be increased from one hundred to one thousand 
ranging from 0.001 to 1, which can improve the accuracy of estimation of the parameters μ and σ. 
This robustness check is applied to certain banks in the sample and the results for Associated 
Bank are displayed in Table 4.2 below. We note that the values of  μ under σ = (0.01:0.01:1) are 
very close to the values of μ under  σ = (0.001:0.001:1). Thus, compared with the enormous 
increase in computation time, the accuracy of the parameters does not significantly improve.  




Table 4.2 Comparison between the parameters under the two sets of   for Associated Bank 
 
= (0.01:0.01:1) indicates the set of 100  from 0.01 to 1, under which the values of  are the same 
as the values of  under = (0.001:0.001:1). 
Date 
=(0.01:0.01:1) =(0.001:0.001:1) 
    
31/03/1986 0.021 0.21 0.021 0.214 
30/06/1986 0.0203 0.21 0.0203 0.214 
30/09/1986 0.0207 0.21 0.0207 0.214 
31/12/1986 0.0212 0.22 0.0212 0.215 
31/03/1987 0.017 0.22 0.017 0.222 
30/06/1987 0.0178 0.22 0.0178 0.221 
30/09/1987 0.0176 0.22 0.0176 0.221 
31/12/1987 0.018 0.22 0.018 0.221 
31/03/1988 0.0166 0.22 0.0166 0.224 
30/06/1988 0.0165 0.22 0.0165 0.224 
30/09/1988 0.0178 0.23 0.0178 0.229 
31/12/1988 0.0166 0.23 0.0166 0.229 
31/03/1989 0.0207 0.24 0.0207 0.242 
30/06/1989 0.0194 0.24 0.0195 0.244 
30/09/1989 0.0198 0.24 0.0198 0.244 
31/12/1989 0.0205 0.24 0.0205 0.243 
31/03/1990 0.0191 0.24 0.0191 0.243 
30/06/1990 0.0185 0.24 0.0185 0.243 
30/09/1990 0.018 0.24 0.018 0.242 
31/12/1990 0.0193 0.24 0.0193 0.24 
 
 
4.2 Dynamics of the Market Value of Assets 
4.2.1. Variance and Covariance of market value of assets 
Through the method displayed in the section 4.1, I am able to build a time series of the market 
values of individual banks’ assets. The methodology of obtaining the two vital input variables for 
estimating systemic risk, asset correlation and asset volatilities, is described in this section. These 
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two input variables are generated from variances and covariances of the market values of the 
banks’ assets which can be estimated by applying the exponentially weighted moving average 
model (EWMA).  This model was originated by RiskMetrics, which is the standard in market risk 
management developed by JP Morgan.  
Table 4.3 below presents the formulas used to compute the equally and exponentially weighted 
volatility for a given set of T returns. The rt  in the following equations represents the return on 
assets at time t and r is the average of the set of T returns. The parameter λ (0< λ<1) is a decay 
factor. 
1 0 
Table 4.3 Volatility estimators 
 
Equally weighted Exponentially weighted 
 
σ =  
1
T











The equally weighted volatility is used by the simple moving average (SMA). The exponentially 
weighted volatility is used by the exponentially weighted moving average model (EWMA). 
Compared with SMA which equally treats previous volatilities, one important advantage of 
EWMA is that it can capture the dynamic features of volatility. According to the RiskMetrics 
framework, in volatility estimation, the later observations usually carry the higher weight than the 
previous ones because the most recent shock is reflected more in the market rather than that due 
to the observations in the distant past. Thus, the aim of using the EWMA model is to apply more 
weights to the more recent volatilities. This is different from the SMA that can only equally 
assign the weight to each observation.  
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For each quarter in the sample period a covariance matrix  t  of asset returns is estimated by 
applying the EWMA model. The EWMA model relies on the decay factor  λ (0< λ<1). This 
parameter affects the relative weights given to older and more recent observations of returns in 
estimating volatility. The more recent observations are applied more weights than the older 
observations.  
The decay factor λ  is set to 0.94 following RiskMetrics. The covariance σij  between the asset 
value of bank i and the asset value of bank j at time t is measured by the following equation: 








j                                       (8) 
The variance-covariance matrix is estimated by applying equation (8) to each asset and pair of 
assets in the portfolio. Thus, the EWMA model is straightforward and convenient to deal with 
when using a large number of assets. In addition, the variance-covariance matrix is guaranteed to 
be positive semi-definite, which is a very important prerequisite of the subsequent systemic risk 
estimation.  
In the estimation procedure, the time series of asset values of each bank as obtained in the last 
section is first converted to an asset return. Then the variance-covariance of these bank asset 
values is used to form the λσij ,t−1 in equation (8). Next, the variance and covariance of the banks 
at each time t are extracted by applying equation (8). 
4.2.2 Correlation and volatility 
Through the equation (8), the dynamics of the variance and covariance can be formed. From both 
the variance and covariance, I can also form the dynamic of the correlation of banks’ assets. The 
standard deviation is considered as the volatility of banks’ assets. Both of the median correlation 
and the median volatility are used to demonstrate the dynamics of the market value of assets. In 
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order to explore the intuition behind the dynamics, I follow Lehar (2005) to establish certain 
regression models to explain the median correlation of a bank to all other banks and the median 
volatility, and the dependent and independent variables developed by Lehar are also introduced 
into the regression analyses. 
 Dependent variables 
The three dependent variables are all related to the factors of the entire banking system. Based on 
the methodology of section 4.2.1, I generate a vector of quarterly variances for each bank and a 
set of quarterly covariances for every pair of banks. The quarterly variances for each bank are 
easily transformed into quarterly standard deviations.  The median value of the quarterly standard 
deviation is treated as the volatility of assets. Using the quarterly variance and covariance, I also 
obtain quarterly correlation for each pair of banks. Both the median value of the correlation and 
volatility in every quarter are used to describe the dynamic of the assets of the U.S. banking 
system by Lehar (2005), they are also considered as systemic factors in the following regression 
analyses.  
The other systemic factor is the median bank capitalization ratio which is equal to the assets of 
the bank divided by its debt.  Bond and Crocker (1993) explored the relation between bank 
capitalization and deposit insurance. They found that premiums charged by insurance contracts 
depend on bank risk which is indicated by the level of capitalization. They also report that bank 
capitalization can reduce the probability of bankruptcy and be used as a complementary tool for 
deposit insurance to protect depositors from the risk of bank failure. Hughes and Mester (1998) 
point out that higher level of bank capitalization can give depositors a signal of safety and reduce 
the probability of a liquidity crisis of a banking system. Thus, bank capitalization plays a very 





Three independent variables related to bank specific factors are established. The first factor is the 
time trend which reflects the direction in each bank’s market value of assets. This factor indicates 
whether a bank’s asset value is increasing or decreasing and at what rate. The first quarter, March 
1986, is the base quarter which has a value for this factor of 100% and every subsequent quarter 
until December 2010 is referred to as the quarter under analysis. The value of this factor for each 
quarter under analysis equals the asset value for the quarter under analysis divided by the asset 
value in the base quarter. This factor can be considered as an indicator of a bank’s financial 
situation based on asset value. 
The second factor is bank size (SIZE), which is measured as the logarithm of the market value of 
assets in each quarter. Since larger banks are able to engage in more different markets, they have 
the potential to be more diversified. The last factor is the ratio of book value of equity to total 
assets (EQBK). EQBK reflects the financial health and long-term profitability of the banks. This 
ratio is used to determine the banks’ overall financial situation. A high ratio indicates that the 
bank is mainly owned by its shareholders, while a low ratio means that the bank is burdened by a 
high level of debt, which will make it difficult to raise funds due to concerns about its solvency. 
A bank with a higher value for EQBK has a higher capital cushion to engage in riskier financial 
markets and become more diversified. This factor is based on the assumption that the banks with 
a higher level of capital cushion have the ability to invest in a riskier market. 
Regression models 
The subsequent regression models (9) and (10) are used to explain the dynamics of the median 
correlation and the median volatility of the assets. The regression model (11) is applied to 
investigate the median capitalization of the banking system. The three dependent variables could 
be indicators of the banking system’s stability. If the median correlation is high, this implies that 
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the banks in the system are tightly connected and the default probability of the entire system is 
high. Bond and Crocker (1993) and Hughes and Mester (1998) conclude that capitalization 
reduces the probability of bankruptcy; thus, a high capitalization ratio lowers the default 
probability of the banking system. 
The three bank specific factors are time trend, size, and EQBK, all of which are treated as the 
independent variables. These three factors are related to each individual bank’s financial health. 
The bank with a high time trend, a large size or a large value for EQBK may be active in various 
markets and be more diversified, which will reduce the probability of default. 
Hypothesis 4: The three independent variables are negatively related to the median correlation 
and volatility, and positively related to capitalization. 
Corrt = α0 + α1Trendt + α2Sizet + α3EQBKt + εt                                                                    (9) 
Volt = α0 + α1Trendt + α2Sizet + α3EQBKt + εt                                                                     (10) 
Capt = α0 + α1Trendt + α2Sizet + α3EQBKt + εt                                                                   (11) 
The Corr, Vol, and Cap in equations (9), (10), and (11) respectively represent the median 
correlation, the median volatility and the median bank capitalization. These symbols are also 
applied in all subsequent regression models and represent the same variables. All dependent and 
independent variables are quarterly median values for all the banks.  
Over the sample period, the U.S. banking industry has gone through a historic development and 
may have been affected by both economic and regulatory factors. Thus, two dummy variables 
capturing the effects of certain events related to regulation and to the economy are used in the 
regression analysis. The first dummy variable concerns the effect caused by the implementation 
of Basel I. 
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As an international financial regulation, Basel I may affect the worldwide banking system. In the 
United States, the environment for bank capital regulation in the 1990s was a result of the 
overhaul of Basel I which was implemented in the beginning in 1990. Wagster (1999) reports that 
Basel I’s risk weighting scheme obliged banks to hold 8% capital backing for loans and 0-1.6% 
capital backing for government securities, which simulated the U.S. banks to re-allocate the assets 
to meet this new capital standards.  Furfine (2000) points out that since the application of the new 
capital standards, a shift has occurred in the U.S. commercial bank portfolios. These banks 
simultaneously began to reduce their investments in commercial lending and increase their 
holdings of government securities. Furfine also indicates that the amount of bank credit invested 
in commercial and industrial loans decreased from 22.5% in 1989 to around 16% in 1994. During 
the same period, the share of bank credit invested in U.S. government securities increased from 
over 15% to around 25%. This shift may reduce the volatility due to the increase of government 
securities; however, the level of correlation would be improved because the bank investments 
become more concentrated.  
The dummy variable DUM89_94 that is introduced the regression models (12), (13), and (14) to 
capture the effect of Basel I. The value of DUM89_94 is 1 for the years from 1989 to 1994 and 0 
for other years. All other variables in these three equations are the same as the variables in model 
(9), (10), and (11).  
The three regression models are re-conducted: 
Hypothesis 5: The dummy variable capturing the effect caused by Basel I improves the level of 
the median correlation, and reduces volatility and capitalization. 
Corrt = α0 + α1Trendt + α2Sizet + α3EQBKt + α4DUM89_94t + εt                                      (12) 
Volt = α0 + α1Trendt + α2Sizet + α3EQBKt + α4DUM89_94t + εt                                        (13) 
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Capt = α0 + α1Trendt + α2Sizet + α3EQBKt + α4DUM89_94t + εt                                      (14) 
The second dummy variable focuses on the economic recession and the financial crisis. The most 
recent influential event is the U.S. sub-prime mortgage financial crisis which started in 2007. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) investigate the sub-prime mortgage financial crisis over the period 
2007 to 2008 and compare it with earlier post-war banking crises in the United States. Thus, the 
second dummy variable DUM07_08 captures the sub-prime mortgage financial crisis of the years 
2007 and 2008.  
Hypothesis 6: The dummy variable of the financial crisis increases the level of the median 
correlation and volatility, and reduces capitalization. 
Corri,t = α0 + α1Trendt + α2Sizet + α3EQBKt + α4DUM07_08t + εt                                   (15) 
Volt = α0 + α1Trendt + α2Sizet + α3EQBKt + α4DUM07_08t + εt                                        (16) 
Capt = α0 + α1Trendt + α2Sizet + α3EQBKt + α4DUM07_08t + εt                                      (17) 
The dummy variable DUM07_08 has a value of 1 for the years 2007 to 2008 and a value of 0 for 
other years. 
 
4.3. Measures of systemic risk 
4.3.1. Systemic risk indices 
A common factor in the various definitions of systemic risk is a trigger event, such as an 
economic shock or an institutional failure resulting in a series of negative economic consequences 
which lead to a simultaneous default of a large number of financial institutions. Lehar (2005) 
points out that the trigger event of a systemic crisis cannot be identified. Thus, this method is not 
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an attempt to measure the systemic risk caused by contagion that implies that the default of an 
individual bank can directly cause the default of other banks or even the entire banking system 
through linkages in the banking market. However, it is possible to measure the probability of a 
systemic crisis by using the portfolio approach, as for example by the probability of a certain 
fraction of defaults over a given time horizon.  
Thus, Lehar (2005) defines a systemic crisis as an event in which a considerable number of 
financial institutions fail simultaneously. Next, the term “systemic risk” is defined by an index 
which captures the risk caused by correlated asset portfolios. Once the joint dynamic of bank 
asset portfolios are estimated, certain indicators of systemic risk can be identified. The first one is 
derived from the probability that banks with total assets of more than a certain percentage Ɛ of all 
banks’ assets become bankrupt within a short period of time. This probability is defined as the 
systemic risk index based on assets SIV(Ɛ) and is represented by: 
                                            𝑉𝑗 ,𝑡+1 < 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑡+1    ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 ⊂ 𝐹,  𝑉𝑗 ,𝑡𝑗∈𝐽 > Ɛ  𝑉𝑖,𝑡𝑖∈𝐹                        (18) 
where J is the fraction of defaulting banks and F is the total number of sample banks. In equations 
(18) and (19), both 𝑉𝑗 ,𝑡+1 and 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑡+1 are the value of assets and the book value of debt in the next 
six months t+1 for each bank j.  A bank will be considered to be bankrupt if the market value of 
its assets is lower than the notional value of its debt within the next six months. The inequality 
 𝑉𝑗 ,𝑡𝑗∈𝐽 > Ɛ  𝑉𝑖,𝑡𝑖∈𝐹  indicates that if the sum of the assets of defaulting banks J exceeds a 
certain fraction Ɛ of the sample’s total assets, then the banking system is considered to have failed. 
In addition, regulators are also concerned that sometimes the number of defaulting financial 
institutions may exceed a certain fraction of the total number of financial institutions. The 
probability that more than a certain fraction ɸ of banks will become insolvent at the same time is 
defined as the systemic risk index based on the number of banks SIN(ɸ) and is defined by: 
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                                                     𝑉𝑗 ,𝑡+1 < 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑡+1 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 ⊂ 𝐹, #𝐽 > ɸ#𝐹                                    (19) 
where the last inequality #𝐽 > ɸ#𝐹 implies that the entire system will default if the number of 
failed banks exceeds a certain fraction ɸ of all the sample banks. 
The value of 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑡+1 is found in the financial statements of each bank at time t+1 and 𝑉𝑗 ,𝑡+1 is 
generated by simulating correlated asset paths. Then 𝑉𝑗 ,𝑡+1 < 𝐵𝑗 ,𝑡+1 will be used as the criterion 
of bank failure. The values of the fractions Ɛ and ɸ that will be considered are 5%, 10% and 15%. 
Then the default probabilities for 5%, 10% and 15% of total assets and the total number of 
institutions are calculated by using Monte Carlo simulation. 
4.3.2. Correlated asset paths                           
According to Lehar (2005), in the measurement of the default probability, the market value of 
each bank’s total assets is governed by a Geometric Brownian motion:  
                                                                      Vj t = μjVjdt + VjdXj                                                  (20) 
where X represents an n-dimensional Brownian motion with variance-covariance matrix  as 
developed in equation (8) in section 4.2 for each time t. To consider the correlation among banks 
Vj t  is defined as  
                                                           Vj t = Vj 0 ∗ e





                                         (21) 
where Xj t  follows a multivariate normal distribution with E[Xj t ]=0n,1, an n1 vector of zeros 
and Var[Xj t ]=t,  is the n-dimensional variance-covariance matrix and  σjj
2  is the jth diagonal 
element of . Vj t  is simultaneously simulated for all the banks. Applying the Cholesky 
decomposition,  can be replaced by UTU in which the UT is an n-dimensional lower triangular 
matrix. Lehar introduces a new variable W which can be defined as 
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                                                            W =  tUTY                                                                      (22) 
where W follows the same distribution as Xj t . In the Monte Carlo simulation and Y is an n1 
vector of independent variables which follow a normal distribution. Then the W is used to 
substitute for  Xj t  and Vj t  is rebuilt as 






                                             (23) 
Using Cholesky decomposition, the joint process of all banks’ market value of assets can be 
simulated. I use MatLab to generate the random vector Y and simulate the systemic risk indexes. 
 
4.3.3. Monte Carlo simulation 
The market value of assets for each sample bank is simulated by using equation (23) in section 
4.3.2. The Vj 0 , a 1001 vector, consists of all the 100 banks’ market value of assets in the first 
quarter. By applying equation (23), a 1001 vector Vj t  the market value of asset for each bank 
in the next six month is generated. Next, both equation (18) and equation (19) are used to 
estimate the two systemic indices, SIV, systemic risk based on assets, and SIN, systemic risk 
based on the number of banks. 
The 1001 vector of Vj t  generated from equation (23) is introduced in equation (18) and 
compared with the vector of Bj t . If the value of Vj t  is less than the value of Bj t , the bank j is 
considered default. Then the defaulting banks are used in the last inequality  𝑉𝑗 ,𝑡𝑗∈𝐽 > Ɛ  𝑉𝑖,𝑡𝑖∈𝐹  
of equation (18). If the total amount of all the defaulting banks’ market value of assets exceeds 
the fraction Ɛ of the sum of the entire sample’s asset value, the system is considered to have failed. 
This simulation is repeated n times.  Then the SIV equals the frequency of defaults divided by the 
number of simulations.  
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Similarly, the SIN is estimated by applying equation (19), in which the vectors Vj t  and Bj t  are 
used to judge whether each individual bank defaults. The last inequality #𝐽 > ɸ#𝐹 is used to 
decide whether the system defaults. If the number of defaulting banks exceeds a certain fraction 
of the total number of banks in the sample, the system is considered to have failed. This 
simulation is also repeated n times.  Then the index SIN equals the frequency of system defaults 
divided by the number of simulations.  
As explained in section 4.1.2, I obtain a vector of quarterly market value of assets for each bank 
from March 1986 to December 2010. However, in the calculation of systemic risk indices, the 
comparison between  Vj t  and Bj t  starts in the next six months following March 1986. Thus, 
the systemic risk indices are calculated for the period September 1986 to December 2010. 
Based on the principle of probability theory, in order to increase the accuracy of the systemic risk 
indices, I have to conduct a large number of simulations. In this thesis, I follow Lehar (2005) and 
conduct 1 million, 2 million and 3 million simulations. I also use also three different values of the 
fraction 5%, 10% and 15% for both Ɛ and ɸ. 
 
4.4 The systemic risk indices 
The two systemic risk indices SIV and SIN are estimated by using Monte Carlo simulation. Next, 
the systemic and bank specific factors and the two dummy variables developed in section 4.2.2 
are introduced in this regression analysis, through which I am able to address which factors 
contribute to systemic risk and decide whether the effects of the financial regulation and crisis 
have influence on the financial health of the U.S. banking industry. 
Hypothesis 7: With regard to the systemic factors, the median correlation and volatility have 
positive relations with the indices; capitalization is negatively related to the indices. 
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The subsequent two regression equations (24) and (25) investigate the relation between the 
systemic risk indices and systemic factors and consider the effect of Basel I (DUM89_94). For 
comparison, the bank specific factors are included in the regression models (26) and (27). All 
dependent and independent variables are the median values for every bank in each quarter.            
SIVt = α0 + α1Corrt + α2Volt + α3Capt + α4DUM89_94t + εt                                                (24) 
SINt = α0 + α1Corrt + α2Volt + α3Capt + α4DUM89_94t + εt                                               (25) 
SIVt = α0 + α1Trendt + α2SIZEt + α3EQBKt + α4DUM89_94t + εt                                      (26) 
SINt = α0 + α1Trendt + α2SIZEt + α3EQBKt + α4DUM89_94t + εt                                      (27) 
The other four regression models (28), (29), (30), and (31) are also conducted to explore whether 
the systemic factors and bank specific factors contribute to the risk indices concerning the effect 
of the U.S. sub-prime mortgage financial crisis.  
SIVt = α0 + α1Corrt + α2Volt + α3Capt + α4DUM07_08t + εt                                                (28) 
SINt = α0 + α1Corrt + α2Volt + α3Capt + α4DUM07_08t + εt                                               (29) 
SIVt = α0 + α1Trendt + α2SIZEt + α3EQBKt + α4DUM07_08t + εt                                      (30) 









Chapter 5. Results 
5.1 Dynamics of market value of assets 
5.1.1 Median correlations and volatilities 
Based on the analysis of section 4.2.1 I obtain the median correlation between bank assets that is 
displayed in Figure 5.1. Figure 5.2 also plots the 30% quantile and 60% quantile correlations over 
the sample period. In the words of Lehar (2005), compared to equity correlations, the asset 
correlations provide superior information as they are not influenced by changes in the capital 
structure. 
Figure 5.1 below displays the quarterly estimates of median correlations between U. S. bank 
assets over the quarters June 1986 through December 2010. There are a total of 4950 pairwise 
















Figure 5.1 Quarterly median correlations for the U.S. banking system 
2 0 
 
The median correlations for the sample are positive over the entire sample period and generally 
show a downtrend between March 1987 and March 2008. There are two peaks in the median 
correlations in March 1990 and March 1999. Following the first quarter of 2008, the median 
correlations begin to trend upwards. 
Over the whole period, although there are several sharp increases captured by the model, the 
entire set of the median correlations of the U.S. commercial banks still remain at a low level 
compared with the median correlations between asset portfolios of European and Japanese banks, 
as estimated  by Lehar (2005). From January 1988 to December 2002, the median correlations of 
bank assets in Europe were above 0.2 and the peaks were beyond 0.4. In the Japanese banking 
sector, the median correlations were even higher than in Europe and remained above 0.4. 
However, in the same period, the median correlations in the U.S. banking industry ranged from to 
the lowest 0.014 in 2002 to the highest 0.051 in 1991, which indicates that the asset portfolios of 
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Figure 5.2 shows the quarterly estimates of median volatilities of U. S. bank assets over the 
quarters June 1986 through December 2010. For each quarter, the volatilities of each of the 100 
banks’ assets are estimated by applying the EWMA, from which the median volatilities are 
obtained.  
Figure 5.2 Quarterly median volatilities for the U.S. banking system 
2 0 
 
Figure 5.2 presents the trend of the median volatilities of the banks’ asset portfolios. We see that 
the median volatilities are very stable, as are the median correlations. There is a slight decrease 
from 1986 to 1996, and then the median volatilities slowly return to the 1986 values in 2010. 
Certain bank specific factors may have some explanatory power for understanding the changes in 
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5.1.2. Relationship between systemic and bank specific factors 
The regression models (9) and (10) in subsection 4.2.2 are used to investigate which of the 
explanatory variables time trend, size, and EQBK significantly affect the two systemic factors, 
the median correlation and volatility, and capitalization. The regression model (11) in subsection 
4.2.2 is used to investigate which of the two explanatory variables time trend and size affect the 
third systemic factor, the median capitalization ratio.  As explained in subsection 4.2.2, EQBK is 
not included as an independent variable in equation (11) to avoid the problem of endogeneity. 
The results of these three regressions are reported in Table 5.1. 
The R-squares shown in Table 5.1 are very high which indicates that all three regression models 
perform very well. The coefficients of time trend in all three regressions imply that this variable 
is significantly related to the three dependent variables. However, time trend has a positive 
relationship with the median correlation and volatility, which violates hypothesis 4. 
Size perfectly explains the three dependent variables in all three regression analyses. It 
significantly reduces the level of the median correlation and volatility, and increases the median 
capitalization. EQBK is negatively related with the median correlation and volatility. The results 
for size and EQBK confirm the hypothesis 4.  
1 0 
Table 5.1 Relationship between the systemic factors and the bank specific factors 
Results obtained from the panel regression analysis which explains the median correlation of a 
bank's asset portfolio with the asset portfolios of all other banks in the sample (Median 
Correlation), the volatility of a bank’s assets (Volatility), and a bank’s capitalization ratio 
(Capitalization). The explanatory variables are the time trend of the bank’s assets (Trend), the 
bank’s size (Size), and the ratio of the bank’s book value of equity to total assets (EQBK). 
  Median Correlation Volatility Capitalization 
N 99 99 99 
R-Squared 0.7252 0.5894 0.8952 
Adjusted R-
Squared 0.7164 0.5763 0.8930 
        
Intercept 0.31327** 25.56928** -6.23787* 
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  (7.63) (11.38) (-2.10) 
        
Trend 0.00002** 0.00346** 0.00235** 
  (3.93) (10.41) (5.52) 
        
Size -0.01795** -1.45012** 0.60592* 
  (-5.80)  (-8.57) (2.79) 
        
EQBK -0.36407** -1.75936   
  (-4.00) (-0.35 )   
Note: 
 * and ** statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively. 
EQBK is not included in the regression analysis on capitalization to avoid the problem of 
endogeneity. 
 
Next, the effect of implementation of the Basel I is analyzed by conducting the regression 
analyses of equations (12), (13) and (14). The R-squareds shown in Table 5.2 are slightly higher 
than the corresponding values in the Table 5.1. Both Size and EQBK are still negatively related to 
median correlation and volatility, and positively related to capitalization, which is consistent with 
the conclusion of the previous regression analysis. The improvement in this analysis is that the 
correlation coefficient between volatility and EQBK becomes significant at the 5% level.  
The coefficients of the dummy variable DUM89_94 in the regressions with median correlation 
and volatility as dependent variables are 0.00839 and -0.50406 respectively and are both 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The negative relation between DUM89_94 and volatility 
confirms hypothesis 5; due to the shift of bank investment from riskier financial markets to 
government securities, the volatility of the U.S. banking industry decreases in the period 1989 to 
1994. Also, this shift makes the bank investment more concentrated; the positive relation between 
the dummy variable and the median correlation indicates that the interconnectedness between 




Table 5.2 The effect of the implementation of Basel I on the relationship between the systemic 
and bank specific factors 
Results obtained from the panel regression analysis which explains the median correlation of 
a bank's asset portfolio with the asset portfolios of all other banks in the sample (Median 
Correlation), the volatility of a bank’s assets (Volatility), and a bank’s capitalization ratio 
(Capitalization). The explanatory variables are the time trend in the bank’s assets (Trend), 
bank size (Size), the ratio of the bank’s book value of equity to total assets (EQBK), and a 
dummy variables which assumes a value of 1 for the years 1989 and 1994 and 0 otherwise to 
capture the effect of implementation of the Basel Accord. 
  Median Correlation Volatility Capitalization 
N 99 99 99 
R-Squared 0.7720 0.6739 0.8962 
Adjusted R-Sq 0.7622 0.6598 0.8929 
        
Intercept 0.25536** 29.05037** -7.29357* 
  (6.41) (13.61) (-2.30) 
        
Trend 0.00002** 0.00384** 0.00229** 
  (3.06) (12.48) (5.32) 
        
Size -0.01494** -1.63065** 0.67750* 
  (-5.12) (-10.45 ) (2.96) 
        
EQBK -0.21914* -10.47081*   
  (-2.44) (-2.18)   
        
DUM89_94 0.00839** -0.50406** 0.13874 
  (4.37) (-4.91) (0.98) 
Note: 
 * and ** statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively. 
EQBK is not included in the regression analysis on capitalization to avoid the problem of 
endogeneity. 
 
Next, the effect of the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis on the relationship between the systemic 
and bank specific factors is analyzed. The results of the regression models (15) and (16) as shown 
in Table 5.3 indicate that both Size and EQBK have strong explanatory power for the median 
correlation and volatility. The negative relationships with median correlation of assets and the 
volatility imply that larger bank sizes and higher capitalization ratios will reduce the effect of 
systemic factors. However, the dummy variable is negatively related with the median correlation 
which is not consistent with hypothesis 6, according to which the sub-prime mortgage crisis 
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should increase the median correlation and further increase the probability of default, which is not 
captured by the dummy variable.  
1 0 
 
Table 5.3 The effect of the U. S. sub-prime mortgage crisis on the relationship between the 
systemic and bank specific factors 
Results obtained from the panel regression analysis which explains the median correlation of a 
bank's asset portfolio with the asset portfolios of all other banks in the sample (Median 
Correlation), the volatility of banks' assets (Volatility), and the banks' capitalization ratio 
(Capitalization). The explanatory variables are time trend of the banks' assets (Trend), bank 
size (Size), the ratio of book value of equity to total assets (EQBK), and dummy for the time 
between 2007 and 2008 to capture the U.S. sub-prime mortgage financial crisis. 
  Median Correlation Volatility Capitalization 
N 99 99 99 
R-Square 0.7679 0.5924 0.9182 
Adj R-Sq 0.7579 0.5749 0.9156 
        
Intercept 0.34049** 25.89456** -8.68225** 
  (8.84) (11.34) (-3.23) 
        
Trend 0.00003** 0.00356** 0.0017** 
  (5.36) (10.11) (4.26) 
        
Size -0.01987** -1.47304** 0.79058** 
  (-6.86) (-8.57) (4.03) 
        
EQBK -0.38686** -2.03173   
  (-4.59) (-0.41)   
        
DUM07_08 -0.01104** -0.1319 0.95856** 
  (-4.14) (-0.83) (5.14) 
Note: 
 * and ** statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively. 








5.2. Systemic risk indices 
Through the application of Monte Carlo simulation, the systemic risk indices SIV and SIN are 
calculated. I generate 9 values of the indices SIV and SIN in every quarter, corresponding to 
fraction values of 5%, 10% and 15% and number of simulations of 1 million, 2 million and 4 
million. 
Table 5.4 displays the probabilities of default with standard errors (in brackets) of the systemic 
risk indices under the three values for the number of simulations in a random quarter. SIV is the 
default probability based on bank assets. SIN is the probability that x% of all banks default 
simultaneously. Note that the standard errors decrease as increase in the number simulations 
increases, thus indicating the increase in accuracy of the estimates. Because the values for SIN 
(15%) are equal or very close to 0, it is not presented in Table 5.4 and the subsequent graphs.  
The results in Table 5.4 show that as the number of simulations increase, the default probabilities 
associated with SIV and SIN do not change much.   
1 0 
Table 5.4 Examples of systemic risk on assets (SIV) and systemic risk on the number of banks 
(SIN) 
    Number of runs in Monte Carlo simulation 
 
1 million 2 million 4 million 
SIV (5%) 
44.027% 43.813% 43.637% 
(0.016%) (0.011%) (0.008%) 
SIV (10%) 
13.801% 13.598% 13.791% 
(0.016%) (0.011%) (0.008%) 
SIV (15%) 
0.545% 0.556% 0.557% 
(0.015%) (0.010%) (0.007%) 
      
SIN (5%) 
11.090% 11.390% 11.508% 
(1.029%) (0.731%) (0.518%) 
SIN (10%) 
2.240% 2.445% 2.318% 




Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 display the trends in both systemic risk indices for different fraction 
values. From the graphs, we find that the indices capture the jump up during the period from 1995 
to 1997. 
Figure 5.3 Probabilities that banks with total assets of more than 5%, 10% and 20% of all 


































































































































































































































Figure 5.4 Probabilities that more than 5%, 10% and 20% of all banks become bankrupt 




5.3. Relationship between the systemic risk indices, the systemic and the bank 
specific factors 
It may not be relevant to just look at the dynamic of the two kinds of systemic risk indices. For a 
researcher’s perspective, it is necessary to check whether these indices can demonstrate systemic 
risk in the U.S. banking industry. Based on section 4.2.2, two categories of explanatory variables 
can be established. The first category is related to systemic risk factors including the median 
correlation of market value of assets, the median volatility of assets and the median capitalization. 
The second group consists of three bank specific factors: time trend, size, and the ratio of equity 
to total assets. Then, the regression analyses of SIV and SIN on the two groups of factors as 
described by equations (26) and (27) are conducted to investigate the relationship between the 
systemic risk indexes and the two groups of factors. 
Table 5.5 shows the results of the regression analyses which explain the indices based on the 























































































































































































































Confirming hypothesis 7, both volatility and capitalization are significantly related to the risk 
indices. The positive relation between DUM89_94 and SIV indicates that the effect of 
implementation of Basel I is to significantly increase systemic risk. It is surprising to observe the 
contrasting relationship between the median correlations and the indexes. As the 
interconnectedness between banks increases, the median correlation should be lower; however, 
this variable is negatively related to the SIN index.   
1 0 
Table 5.5 
Results obtained from the panel regression explaining SIV and 
SIN at 5%. The explanatory variables are the median 
correlation, volatility, capitalization, and the dummy variable 
















































 * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% 
level. 
 
In comparison, Table 5.6 displays the relationship between the indices of systemic risk and bank 
specific factors as represented by equations (26) and (27). Only bank size is statistically 
significantly related to SIV and SIN. The negative coefficients of size indicate that larger banks 
contribute less to systemic risk. The dummy variable is positively related to SIV and negatively to 
SIN.  Thus, the effect of the implementation of Basel I is to increase the probability that a certain 
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portion of bank assets will be in default, but decreases the probability that a certain number of 
banks will be in default.   
1 0 
Table 5.6 
Results obtained from the panel regression explaining SIV and 
SIN at 5%. The explanatory variables are trend, size, EQBK, 
and the dummy variable which captures the effect of 















































 * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% 
level. 
 
Table 5.7 shows the results of the regression of the indices of systemic risk on the systemic 
factors, as well as the dummy variable which captures the effect of the subprime mortgage crisis, 
as represented by equations (28) and (29). The coefficients of volatility and capitalization confirm 
hypothesis 7; however, median correlation still is positively related to SIV and negatively to SIN. 
The results also indicate the significant positive relation between the dummy variable and SIV, 







Results obtained from the panel regression explaining SIV and 
SIN at 5%. The explanatory variables are the median 
correlation, volatility, capitalization, and the dummy variable 
which captures the effect of the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 















































 * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% 
level. 
 
The results of the regression of the indices of systemic risk on the bank specific factors as well as 
the dummy variable which captures the effect of the subprime mortgage crisis, as represented by 
regression equations (30) and (31) are shown in Table 5.8.  We note that only bank size has a 
significant negative relationship with both systemic risk indexes. In the regression model of SIV, 
the dummy variable has a positive coefficient that is significant at the 5% level. This 











Results obtained from the panel regression explaining SIV and 
SIN at 5%. The explanatory variables are trend, size, EQBK, 
and the dummy variable which captures the effect of the sub-















































 * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% 
level. 
 
Chapter 6. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I form two systemic risk indexes to investigate the financial health and stability of 
the U.S. banking industry from 1986 to 2010. These two indices include the default probability 
based on bank assets (SIV) and the default probability based on the number of banks (SIN). The 
target sample consists of 100 U.S. commercial banks. An important input to measurement of the 
systematic risk indexes is the market value of assets, which is estimated by the contingent claims 
analysis of Merton (1973) and the maximum likelihood estimation method developed by Duan 
(1994). With the market value of assets, Monte Carlo simulation is applied to form these two 
systemic risk indices.  
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In the regression analysis for systemic and bank specific factors, the dummy variable DUM89_94 
is positively related to the median correlation of assets and negatively related to the volatility of 
assets, which means the effect of Basel I improves the median correlation and reduces the 
volatility. This implies that the shift of bank investment from riskier financial markets to 
government securities caused by the new risk based capital standards in Basel I did reduce 
volatility; however, it also makes bank investment more concentrated in a few markets which will 
simulate the correlation of banks’ assets and increase the probability of simultaneous default. 
Thus the implementation of Basel I does not improve the stability of the U.S. banking industry. 
The effect of implementation of Basel I reduces the systemic volatility, but cannot completely 
control systemic risk due to the stronger correlation among the banks’ assets. This conclusion is 
also confirmed by the results of the regression analysis for the systemic risk indices on systemic 
factors, in which the effect of Basel I does not restrain systemic risk.  
The dummy variable capturing the effect of the U.S. sub-prime mortgage financial crisis in 2007 
– 2008 presents a significantly positive relation with SIV, which indicates that the systemic risk 
in the U.S. banking system increases during this financial crisis. This confirms the hypothesis 2 
and this financial crisis contributes to the systemic risk of the U.S. banking industry. 
The regression analyses of the systemic risk indices on systemic and bank specific factors 
indicate that most systemic factors including the median correlation of bank assets, the volatility 
of assets and the capitalization ratio, are statistically significantly related to the risk indices. In 
contrast, of the bank specific factors, only bank size is significantly related to both indexes. This 
confirms that the systemic factors perform better than the bank specific factors in explaining the 
measures of systemic risk. This result is also consistent with the point suggested by Eisenburg 
and Noe (2001) who state that the risk caused by bank specific factors can be diversified through 
portfolio diversification. Thus, in an established financial system like the U.S. banking industry, 
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the bank specific factors do not have strong explanatory power for the stability of the entire 
system. 
In summary, the systemic risk indices SIV and SIN do indicate the financial health of the U.S. 
banking system. According to the results of the regression analysis, volatility and capitalization 
have strong explanatory power for the systemic risk indices. However, the median correlation 
only has a moderate influence on SIV. Thus, the index SIV may perform better than SIN in 
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